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This article considers nine selected products which 
account for 50% of the gross valueofoutputandalso 
have a clear regional differentiation. The period ana-
lysed is from 1970 to 1985. 
The results of the analysis show that develop-
ments in the farming sector depend to a large extent 
on international factors and on the policies intro-
duced to adjust the country's external accounts. The 
situation of each product is different in the medium 
and short terms, depending on the effects of the 
general and specific policies. In a longer-term pers-
pective, the visible trends in production are due to 
great strength in rice —the main product of Peru's 
agriculture which is cultivated mainly on the coast— 
and to a similar strength in the cultivation of hard 
yellow maize and the production of poultry meat and 
beef. The first three products show the influence of 
sustained policies for imports substitution and modi-
fication of consumption patterns. Cotton and coffee 
show an upward linear trend despite the exchange-
rate slippage and the falls in their internal and exter-
nal prices, while the decisive factor in sugar cane 
seems to be the availability of water for its cultiva-
tion. The situation of the traditional mountains 
crops is different; potatoes show a downward trend 
and starch maize follows a consistent linear trend 
independent of the adjustment policies introduced. 
The impact of exchange rate, monetary and 
wages policies have different effects on agricultural 
output in different regions. On the coast, producers 
of poultry meat and some rice producers seem to 
have been hurt by the austerity policies, which at the 
same time seem to have benefitted producers of 
sugar cane, cotton and hard yellow maize, and some 
rice producers. Lastly, the situation is unclear in the 
forest regions. The cutback in lending has had 
adverse effects on production of rice and hard yellow 
maize, yet this last product has been benefitted by the 
real exchange rate. 
"Economist. Consultant to the Joint ECI.AC/FAO 
Agriculture Division. 
I 
Background and aspects 
of overall development 
The Peruvian economy is under the influence of 
a long-term crisis which has shown considerable 
fluctuation. There is a consensus to the effect 
that the economy was at its most dynamic in the 
mid-1960s. Since then it has experienced the 
1967-1968 crisis, a period of stagnation up to 
1972, a brief expansion in 1973-1975 based on 
foreign borrowing, and from 1975 to 1985 a 
series of serious crises interrupted by periods of 
stagnation. 
In 1985 the per capita gross domestic pro-
duct was much the same as in 1965. Average real 
wages in 1984 were 22% lower than in 1957 and 
salaries 47% lower. Wage incomes amounted to 
38.7% of the national income in 1950 and 46.5 % 
in 1976 before the present crisis began. The 
sacrifice during the expansion was made by inde-
pendent workers, particularly farmers, who saw 
their share in the national income fall from 21.5 
to 9.1% between those two years. In the 1980s, 
in contrast, the recession concentrated its grea-
test relative impact on urban wage-earners. 
The pre-crisis period was characterized by a 
process of industrialization in a situation of 
abundant foreign exchange which facilitated the 
establishment of an assembly industry and an 
agroindustry based on the processing of 
imported foodstuffs. This caused considerable 
internal dislocation. 
The stagnation of industrial productivity 
caused by the lack of technological innovation 
led to an increasing loss of relative competitive-
ness and an increasing trade deficit. The main 
features of Peruvian industry in this period were 
the lower level of internal integration and the 
low productivity. 
The most important development in agri-
culture in the period leading up to the crisis was 
the agrarian reform, a process which since the 
mid-1950s had been a major political football, to 
the detriment of the sector's progress and 
investment in agriculture and livestock in 
particular. 
Various reforms were introduced from the 
early 1960s, culminating in the 1969 reform, the 
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most radical and decisive of all. The crisis and the 
adjustment occurred when the structure of land 
ownership and tenancy had just undergone radi-
cal change. 
Accordingly, the agricultural sector was in a 
very shaky technological and administrative con-
dition owing to the withdrawal of some of its 
most experienced technicians and the establish-
ment of the new institutions. 
The change of government in 1976, which 
coincided with the onset of the crisis, reduced 
even further the political weight of farm produc-
ers in the modern sector co-operativized by the 
agrarian reform. The new official policy was 
more broadly favourable to privately and indi-
vidually owned businesses. However, the fact 
that the reform was part of the justification of 
the military take-over, together with other fac-
tors, meant that the process of anti-associative 
institutional change was initially slow. 
1. Regional features of agriculture 
The land resource is scarce in Peru. Only 5.9% of 
the country's area is suitable for crops, i.e., 
roughly 7.6 million hectares, of which some 2.9 
million are actually cultivated. Of this total, 
about 750 000 hectares are at the Coast, 1.7 mil-
lion in the Sierra and 400 000 in the Selva 
(forest). 
The Coast has 26% of the arable land and 
contributes about 50% of the sector's gross 
domestic product. It has irrigated land of very 
good quality. It has a great future potential for 
increased productivity and expansion of the irri-
gated area. The main crops are cotton, rice and 
sugar; poultry farming is also concentrated in 
this region. 
The Sierra is the least productive region; it 
has half the cultivated land but contributes only 
25% of the sectoral product. Its agriculture is 
basically unirrigated and there is little possibility 
of extending the frontier. Its main crop is pota-
toes, but its beef is among the most important of 
the country's farm products. 
The Selva, lastly, is the most extensive 
region but it is extremely fragile from the eco-
logical standpoint. Nevertheless, it has the grea-
test potential for expansion of the cultivated 
area. Coffee, hard yellow maize and rice are the 
main crops. 
2. Agricultural and overall production 
Agriculture's contribution to the national econ-
omy has been steadily declining in recent 
decades. In 1970 the sector contributed 14.6% of 
the gross domestic product, a proportion which 
fell to 10.8% in 1980. In the period 1982-1984, 
which corresponds to the second recessionary 
adjustment, for the first time in a long time 
agriculture increased its contribution to the 
national total, delivering 13% of what was pro-
duced in the country. 
In the 1970s the importance of agricultural 
production for the external market declined and, 
according to the available information, produc-
tion was reoriented towards the domestic 
market. 
In the midst of the crisis the shortage of 
foreign exchange and the devaluation of the cur-
rency invested the Sierra with increased impor-
tance, although it is the least productive zone. 
The transformation of Peru into a net importer 
of food since the end of the 1970s has placed the 
problem of the agricultural backwardness of the 
Andean region at the centre of the debate about 
development strategies. However, it is probable 
that cultural factors are more influential than the 
actual possibilities of making the Sierra the axis 
of the country's agriculture. 
PERU: AGRICULTURE, CRISIS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY / ;. Iguiñiz 159 
II 
The adjustment policies 
There have been two periods of stringent adjust-
ment in the last 10 years: 1976-1978 and 1982-
1983. The principal method was devaluation 
with inflation and a closed economy, which 
meant that the anti-inflation goals were secon-
dary to those of external balance. In other words, 
the inflation policy was used to attain this bal-
ance at a lower level of domestic production 
activity. 
The following were the main features of the 
adjustment policy: 
1. Exchange-rate policy 
A close relationship has been established 
between variations in the real exchange rate and 
the level of overall economic activity. The policy 
of raising the exchange rate was the commonest 
way of influencing the external imbalances and 
the level of domestic activity. This was the case 
in 1976-1978. The effectiveness of devaluation 
in raising the real exchange rate was relatively 
less in 1982-1983 because domestic prices 
increased independently of the devaluation 
owing to incidental factors such as the floods, 
droughts and avalanches. 
At the end of the 1970s and in the early 
1980s a ready supply of foreign exchange was 
provided by the increased exports and the 
unblocking of the World Bank loans. As a result 
the real exchange rate underwent a sizeable 
decline. 
At the end of 1981 the devaluation speeded 
up under the impact of the worsening of the 
terms of trade, and inflation did likewise. This 
development continued until mid-1983, briefly 
interrupted for nine months but then moving 
ahead again until the change of government in 
1985. 
In brief, during the decade of crisis the basic 
exchange-rate policy had two periods of rising 
rates and an intermediate period in which the 
slippage was used as an anti-inflation tool. 
The record of the impact of the variations in 
the exchange rate on inflation shows that the 
prices of the categories of product classified as 
"tradeable" by the Central Reserve Bank (BCR) 
reacted with a lag of two quarters, while the 
prices of "non-tradeables" reacted immediately. 
These results indicate that in Peru's institu-
tional context, particularly in its labour market, 
exchange-rate policy was one of the fundamental 
means of causing domestic inflation to rise or 
fall, aggregate demand to decline or increase, and 
imports to contract or expand. 
2. Prices policy 
The increase in public tariffs and prices con-
trolled by the State was also a decisive tool in 
reducing the fiscal deficit and aggregate demand, 
especially from 1981. 
The ratio of the indices of controlled prices 
to the overall consumer index was 0.55 in 1981, 
but it rose to 1.37 in 1982 and then remained 
above unity until 1984. It was 1.06 in 1982,1.28 
in 1983 and 1.16 in 1984. 
With respect to specific increases of con-
trolled prices in this period, the price of gasoline 
always moved faster than inflation, while the 
relative prices of controlled foods rose in 1981 
and 1983 and public tariffs in 1981, 1982 and 
1984. 
3. Tariff policy and protection 
These policies were not so important in generat-
ing recessions. Three periods can be 
distinguished: 
— The period 1976-1978: tariffs were not 
changed but domestic production was given 
greater protection by the rising exchange 
rate. The final net result was an increase of 
70% in protection, in spite of which output 
fell as a result of the drop in incomes caused 
by the increased inflation. 
— The period 1979-1981: the domestic market 
was opened up, tariffs were reduced, and the 
exchange-rate slippage resulting from the 
great expansion of exports increased the 
effectiveness of the liberalization measures. 
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These exports came from the investment 
projects started in the first half of the decade 
and they were also a response to higher 
international prices. The lowest average 
tariff level of 32% was achieved in 1981, 
with the maximum tariff, without sur-
charge, falling from 155 to 60%. The main 
tool of the liberation policy was the elimina-
tion of bans. Between the end of 1978 and 
the end of 1979 the number of prohibited 
import items fell from 1 852 to only nine and 
the number of free import items rose from 
1 753 to 3 745. This process did not last long 
but long enough to renew and build up 
stocks of domestic consumer durables, 
imported automobiles, etc- The level of pro-
tection in 1981, including the effect of the 
exchange rate, was again similar to the pre-
crisis level, i.e., between 40 and 50% of the 
maximum level of 1978. 
— The period 1982-1983: tariffs were 
increased when the fall in international 
prices persisted and imports soared 
—US$1 668 million in 1978 and US$3 802 
million in 1981. A surcharge of 15% ad 
valorem was established in 1982, a further 
surcharge of 10% on CIF value in 1983 and 
another of 17% in 1984, which considerably 
increased the level of protection. The 
renewed upward movement of the exchange 
rate at the same time increased the protec-
tion of donte"stic production. 
The domestic market was thus closed and a 
return was made to the method of securing 
adjustment by reducing the general level of 
domestic activity by lowering the aggregate 
demand. This method is demonstrably effective 
in reducing imports and freeing foreign 
exchange for payment of creditors, or for reten-
tion in State hands, instead of providing it to 
importers. 
4. ïncome and public spending policies 
In 1978, the most critical year of the first adjust-
ment, the income of the central government was 
3% higher than in 1975. This came about owing 
to the increase of 372% in the fuel tax and the 
commencement of new mining exports subject 
to taxes and despite the drop of 38.8% in the 
income tax. 
Against the background of crisis, transfers of 
capital from the government to public enter-
prises were reduced, the gross formation of capi-
tal by the central government was maintained, 
pay fell, and there were increases in the payment 
of interest and principal on the foreign debt and 
to a lesser extent in defence spending. In these 
circumstances public enterprises made sizeable 
cutbacks in their investment expenditure by ter-
minating the most expensive projects. 
In the 1980s, during the second adjustment, 
the central government's real income fell 
sharply (29.3%) in 1981-1983. The income tax 
was cut (-38.3%), as were taxes on foreign trade 
(39.3%). The fuel tax was raised 32.4%, but this 
was not sufficient to offset the other declines. 
Accordingly, all items of expenditure were 
cut in real terms in 1982, except for foreign debt 
and defence payments. Defence spending was 
also cut back in 1983, but the total amount of 
these two items was nevertheless maintained in 
global terms owing to the increased payments 
abroad. 
5. Monetary and credit policies 
Monetary policy contributed to the decline in 
nominal incomes and domestic demand and thus 
to the recessionary adjustment. In 1981-1983 it 
moved from a first stage (1981-1982), in which 
the goal was to support growth through credit 
and liquidity, to a second stage (1982-1983), in 
which the priority was protection of the level of 
reserves, with the level of domestic activity bear-
ing the burden of the cost of the external obliga-
tions and the drop in international prices. 
The goal of protecting the reserves was in 
fact re-established in September 1982. Lending 
to the public sector was cut and public enter-
prises were encouraged to borrow abroad in the 
short term, while domestic lending to the pri-
vate sector was increased. Reserves increased as 
a result of the inflow of foreign loans due to the 
availability of World Bank loans after a decade of 
blockage. 
The monetary restriction was intensified in 
the first half of 1983 but relaxed in the second, 
for the Central Bank had to help the central 
government with its serious arrears of payment. 
At this time it was still not possible to protect 
the tevel of reserves by recourse to short-term 
borrowing. 
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In these circumstances the effective average 
level of cash reserves did not decline despite the 
measures taken. Furthermore, interest rates 
proved to have very little impact in the adjust-
ments. They were consistently negative in real 
terms. The most important feature of monetary 
policy was the intense dollarization resulting 
from the greater profitability of dollar deposits. 
As to the institutional framework, with a 
view to promoting the development of the 
financial system a policy of institutional liberali-
zation was introduced during the government 
which came to office in 1980; this policy 
envisaged: 
— Unification of the ceiling of passive interest 
rates at 55%; 
— Reduction to zero of the marginal reserve 
requirement on national currency deposits; 
— De-restriction of the period of capitalization 
of interest; 
— Authorization for financial bodies to carry 
out short-term operations and for the coun-
try's commercial and foreign banks to make 
loans of one to five years. 
The results of this experiment were disap-
pointing. Almost no progress was made in 
a t t r a c t i n g d e p o s i t s or in f i n a n c i a l 
intermediation. 
6. Results 
From the simplified standpoint of the indicators 
which have the best systematic interrelation-
ship, a systematic negative ratio is observed 
between the real exchange rate and the gross 
domestic product. 
Reserves recovered rapidly after the first 
adjustment programme in 1978, but this was due 
not so much to the domestic contraction as to the 
completion of big mining and petroleum pro-
jects started in the first half of the decade. In 
1983, in contrast, the level of reserves was main-
tained at the cost of a heavy cutback in produc-
tive economic activities. 
The devaluations had an important impact 
on the reduction of imports but not on the 
increase of exports. This meant that the trade 
balance problems could not be resolved by this 
means. It has been established that exports were 
affected more by the big investment projects, as 
happened in 1979 and to some extent in 1984. In 
fact, the investment in big projects coincided 
with times of expanding output and therefore 
with the disbursement of external financing 
unconnected with refinancing of the debt. How-
ever, it is not easy to relate the expansion of the 
domestic market to the inflow of this capital. 
The multiplier effect ought not to have had very 
much impact as most of the investment was 
imported. 
This demonstrates that external financing 
had a considerable effect on imports. The 
income elasticity of imports is much less when 
imports financed by long-term loans are dis-
counted. Accordingly, the increased imports 
which coincided with increases in the gross 
domestic product were not entirely attributable 
to industry, just as the cutbacks were not due 
entirely to the austerity policies. 
There is no statistical association between 
the movement of the gross domestic product and 
the performance of the balance of payments, or 
between this balance and the debt service; the 
debt service remained stable regardless of what 
was happening in the country. 
The drop in imports as a result of the deva-
luations was closely linked with the declines or 
slowdowns in the gross domestic product. 
The policy of higher real exchange rates was 
clearly associated with the reduction of real 
wages and vice versa. In the long term, however, 
the ratio between these two variables was posi-
tive. Factors in this were the increased exports, 
the exchange-rate slippage in 1979-1980 to neu-
tralize the corresponding monetary impact, and 
the renewed access to external loans in the first 
years of the last decade. 
Nevertheless, the negative impact of the 
devaluations on wages was greater than the posi-
tive impact of the exchange-rate slippage. This 
was because the abundant foreign exchange was 
used only marginally to improve wages and 
domestic demand. It was actually used by prefer-
ence to: 
— Service the foreign debt, including advance 
payments; 
— Increase imports of consumer and capital 
goods, many of which were consumer 
durables; 
— Make good the international reserves defic-
its resulting from the continuation of eco-
nomic expansion up to 1977. 
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In view of this policy, it is understandable 
that the country's output should have fallen so 
far during the last decade despite the fact that 
exports tripled in value in the middle of the 
period. 
The cutback in liquidity was due to two fac-
tors: the monetary policy and the incentives for 
saving in foreign currency. Furthermore, the lag 
in nominal incomes caused by the devaluation 
and inflation meant that liquidity also declined, 
and in addition to this the monetary policy made 
the lag in wage rises more effective and lasting. 
The money supply thus helped to ensure 
that the reduced demand for liquidity was bal-
anced at a lower level or that the increase in 
nominal incomes took longer, thus maintaining 
the higher exchange rate which had been 
achieved. 
The available information indicates that the 
movement of liquidity in relation to the gross 
domestic product was very similar to that of 
wages, but there was a much weaker relationship 
between these income and production variables 
and the total liquidity; this would indicate that 
the dollarization policy converged with the aus-
terity programme. 
Public expenditure has been held responsi-
ble for generating excess demand and therefore 
inflation. However, if only domestic income and 
expenditure ¡^considered, there is a surplus; and 
if interest payments on the debt but not the 
government's imports are eliminated from the 
The approach taken in this article to evaluate the 
impact of economic policy on agricultural devel-
opment is to make an analysis by products, for in 
Peru they have a clearly regional association. 
The nine main products are considered for this 
purpose, representing about 50% of the gross 
value of agricultural output. This method is 
based on the assumption of great heterogeneity 
in Peruvian agriculture. 
calculation, the resulting deficit is much smaller 
than the official estimates. Accordingly, the 
demand-generating and in the long term infla-
tionary impact of public spending, even in the 
worst of cases, was smaller than asserted. This 
shows that the aim of fiscal policy was to 
increase the domestic surplus and use it to 
finance the servicing of the foreign debt. 
Lastly, in order to fill out very briefly the 
economic policy developments described in ear-
lier paragraphs, we must record some of the 
many indicators of the people's living standards. 
The per capita gross domestic product fell 
sharply but wages fell even further. According to 
certain health indicators, poverty increased 
dramatically and was reflected in the incidence of 
transmissible and respiratory diseases and polio-
myelitis and in the percentage of undernour-
ished children. Morbidity increased enormously 
during the crisis (between 1974 and 1983). The 
incidence of transmissible diseases notified in 
1983 was 431.3% higher than the incidence not-
ified in the national health system during 1974. 
The increase was 1 184% for acute respiratory 
diseases. 
As for income distribution, wages amounted 
to 46.9% of the national income in 1974,40.1% 
in 1980 and only 33.9% in 1984. In real terms, 
wages were 27.4% lower in 1984 than in 1974, 
while business profits were 51.9% higher and 
the urban per capita gross domestic product 
19.7% lower than in 1961 despite the drop in the 
migration rate. 
The analysis which follows is based on indi-
vidual study of the trends throughout the period 
1970-1985 and fluctuations around these trends. 
The main justification for this method lies in the 
existence of distinct factors of economic policy 
and temporary or cyclical movements in the 
economy as a whole in the long term, which in 
this case is taken to be 15 years. In this study a 
statistical relationship is considered to be posi-
III 
Agriculture and the adjustment policies 
PERU: AGRICULTURE, CRISIS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY /J. Iguiñiz 163 
tive and strong when the long-term trends fol-
low a similar curve and there is a strong 
statistical relationship between the fluctuations 
around these trends. In this case we consider that 
the impact of one variable on another is "structu-
ral", i.e., it affects both the immediate and the 
long-term curve of the trend. When this is the 
case the impact of the policy is very great, for it 
continues over a long period and affects, 
throughout the 15 years, the long-term trajec-
tory prior to the crisis and accordingly the mid-
dle levels around which future fluctuations will 
occur. This power has precisely the effect of 
causing very rapid changes in the long-term path 
of the variables. The study does not take into 
account the long-term effects which will be vis-
ible only in that long term and which will proba-
bly be of great importance in some respects, such 
as technology. The relationships between varia-
bles are not so strong when, for example, the 
trends are similar but the fluctuations are not 
related; we then conclude that the similarity is 
due to factors beyond the scope of the study. On 
the other hand, if the trends are not similar but 
the fluctuations in the variables have a statisti-
cally significant relationship, we conclude that 
the influence of one variable on another is very 
short Term and does not have a "structural" 
impact on it. In this summary we present only 
some of the graphic or statistical evidence, so 
that it should indeed be a summary. We have 
preferred to establish very simple equations in 
the regressions even though their explanatory 
level is low. 
1. Potatoes 
Potatoes are the main product of the Sierra and 
in the long term their output shows a downward 
trend, the linear path of which is not affected by 
the long-term variations in the country's total 
output and in wages or in its own price relative 
to the general consumer price index. The short-
term variations fluctuated around this linear 
path. Nor did the weather or credit affect the 
long-term production levels. In fact, during the 
15 years of the period under study the long-term 
trend of credit was linear and upward while, as 
pointed out, the output trend was linear and 
downward. The credit curve indicates that the 
macroeconomic adjustment policy did not affect 
the trend before the crisis. Potato production 
thus seems to have been unaffected by the 
national economic crisis; it proceeds with its 
own crisis. 
The picture was different in the short term 
since, to begin with, a clear inverse ratio was 
established between prices and quantities, and 
the weather clearly had an impact on the move-
ment of these two variables. It appears that 
variations in the amount of rainfall determined 
variations in the areas sown and harvested and 
the harvest determined the market price. This is 
because we are dealing here with unirrigated 
agriculture. 
It has been established that another short-
term factor was the amount of credit granted by 
the Agrarian Bank in the sowing season, which 
is in the calendar year preceding the harvest 
year. It must be stressed that in view of the 
restriction of lending, the loans were concen-
trated on the most efficient production units. 
However, the inverse ratio between the trend 
paths of the two variables raises questions about 
the impact of lending on output. It is clear that, 
although the credit obtained each year generally 
varied in the same direction as output, as the 
years passed an increasing volume of credit was 
obtained per ton produced and that the loans 
grew steadily less effective. 
The short-term variation in real producer 
incomes, measured by the gross real value of 
potato production, depended on the variation in 
relative prices. As these were affected by the 
variation in the quantities produced, it might be 
expected that the main determinant of the 
incomes of peasant potato farmers was the 
amount produced. However, setting this factor 
against the impact of the real exchange rate of 
the previous year, we find that the latter domi-
nated the former and that this typical adjust-
ment factor in Peru is the most probable 
explanation for the variation in peasant 
incomes. Apparently the close relationship 
between the real exchange rate of the previous 
year and the gross real value of potato produc-
tion was due to a very powerful substitution 
effect between potatoes and wheat. Potatoes 
thus behaved as a kind of tradeable good. The 
influence of demand fell to the point at which 
there was no significant relationship between 
the variation ín relative prices and the variation 
in real wages. 
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2. Rice 
Rice is the main product of Peruvian agriculture; 
it is based on the Coast and is increasing most 
strongly in the Selva. In the case of this product 
there was a weak relationship between the long-
term paths of its output and its relative price and 
the path of the macroeconomic variables. One 
important reason for this was the permanent 
priority assigned to this crop and the support 
policies which were maintained in the midst of 
the crisis. The trend of credit for this activity 
rose in the 1980s when the economy was under-
going its main crisis. 
The variations in the gross real value of 
output were due more to variation in the quan-
tity than in the price. The fluctuations of credit 
followed output fluctuations very closely, with a 
year's lag. Therefore, the adjustment policies 
which temporarily restricted the growth of 
credit affected the incomes of rice producers, but 
the decline was offset to some extent by selected 
subsidies. 
Since the domestic price of rice in the husk 
was influenced primarily by movements in the 
international prices of husked rice and secondly 
by movements in the real interest rate, we con-
sider this product to be a trade able good 
although it is intended for the domestic market. 
3. Sugar cane 
Long-term sugar cane output depended to a large 
extent on the flow of the Coast rivers in the 
previous year. Prices followed a similar path to 
real wages and international sugar prices. 
The gross real value of output depended in 
both long and short terms on the variation of 
prices rather than on the amounts produced. The 
variation of the real exchange rate and real 
wages in the previous year together explain the 
fluctuation in the value produced. This is one of 
the few examples of a farm product in which the 
demand seems to play a powerful role in deter-
mining the value through its impact on the 
quantity produced. However, it is difficult to 
understand why in each year means of produc-
tion should adapt to the demand of the previous 
year even though the sugar actually came almost 
entirely onto the domestic market. 
Since prices and quantities are determined 
independently, the adjustment policy, with 
higher real exchange rates and lower real earn-
ings, will have had a double effect on the real 
incomes of cane producers. On the one hand, a 
positive effect via higher product prices; on the 
other hand, a negative effect via reduction of 
quantities owing to lower demand. The informa-
tion obtained seems to indicate that the positive 
effects were more important. 
4. Cotton 
Despite the downward trend of domestic prices 
as a result of the behaviour of the international 
price and the long-term exchange rate slippage, 
cotton output maintained a linear and upward 
trend during the 15 years in question. Variations 
in the national economy do not seem to have 
affected this path. 
The fluctuations in the relative price show a 
close connection with international prices in 
harvest periods and also with the real exchange 
rate of the previous year. This is apparently due 
to the forms of payment to the producers, which 
take into account the international price at the 
moment of delivery of the product. 
The short-term variation in the quantity 
produced depended primarily on the variation of 
profits in the previous year. Furthermore, since 
prices depended on the real exchange rate and 
international prices, the gross real value of out-
put ought to have risen in both price and quan-
tity with the implementation of the adjustment 
policies. The most powerful determinant varia-
ble was therefore the real exchange rate of the 
previous period. 
5. Coffee 
Coffee output and its gross value showed an 
upward linear trend despite the downward 
movement of prices from 1979. 
In the short term the gross value of output 
was associated with variations in the domestic 
price, which was based on the international 
price, and in the exchange rate in the previous 
period. This product is intended primarily for 
the external market and its supply depends basi-
cally on its profitability. 
Accordingly, coffee producers were benefit-
ted in the long and short terms both by higher 
international prices and by the adjustment poli-
cies which raised the real exchange rate. 
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6. Hard yellow maize 
The price trend of hard yellow maize moved 
roughly in step with the international price up to 
the middle of the period under analysis. The 
paths then diverged: the domestic price fell 
while the international price rose. The produc-
tion trend turned downward at the beginning of 
the crisis but it has risen considerably in the 
1980s. As in the case of rice, movements in 
maize output reflected a specific incentives pol-
icy. The aim was imports substitution. The spe-
cific policy offset any long-term effects of the 
crisis and the adjustment policy. 
Fluctuations in the short-term price of maize 
depended on variations in the international 
price and the real exchange rate. This is the 
product which was subject to greatest competi-
tion from imports. Variations in the quantities 
produced had the greatest effect on the gross 
value of output and they apparently depended 
heavily on the availability of credit in the same 
year. This being the case, the stabilization poli-
cies will have affected maize production. Never-
theless, real incomes do not seem to have been 
affected. 
On the other hand, demand had a clear 
impact on imports. Variations in real wages also 
affected the supply and therefore the amount to 
be imported, but not the price or the output in 
the following year. 
7. Starch maize 
Starch maize, a mountain product and therefore 
of peasant origin, showed a constant linear pro-
duction trend unconnected with the adjustment 
policies. This is a similar case to potatoes, 
another mountain product. The long-term tra-
jectory of the relative price was also similar to 
that of potatoes, i.e., ascending quadratic before 
the crisis and descending throughout the crisis. 
The short-term price was also inversely 
related to the quantity produced. Wages in the 
previous year, unlike the case of potatoes, seem 
to have influenced output; this would indicate 
that output increased in expectation of increased 
demand. However, a more formal analysis is 
needed to evaluate the actual likelihood of such 
planning in peasant production. 
The adjustment policies which reduced real 
wages and therefore the production of this type 
of maize do not necessarily seem to have 
impaired the gross value of output, for prices 
offset this effect. The higher real exchange rate, 
on the other hand, caused a production cutback 
but also a price increase. The final outcome 
seems to have been favourable to this product. 
The corresponding regression with the real 
exchange rate was positive but not significant. 
8. Poultry meat 
In the long term, output of poultry meat, the 
main livestock product, showed a linear and 
upward trend, which was due to the heavy substi-
tution of consumption in favour of this item. 
There was also a parallel downward trend in 
prices. The crises and the adjustments had no 
effect on these long-term trends. Recently, as in 
the case of rice and hard maize, the specific 
policies have offset the usual effects of the 
recession. 
In the short term, fluctuations in quantities 
had a greater effect than other variables on pri-
ces, with an inverse ratio. A direct association 
can also be seen between real wages and output, 
and so demand factors seem to have dominated 
in the short term. This is the statistically most 
reliable and officially clearest case of the impact 
of restrictive demand policies. The odd thing is 
that the main impact was on the quantity pro-
duced and not on prices. This is in fact consistent 
with the earlier account which established a 
direct connection between variations in the real 
exchange rate and variations in poultry meat 
prices, but this effect acted through a recessive 
impact on demand and the impact of demand on 
the quantities produced, which in turn influ-
enced the prices. The improvement of prices in a 
recession was not offset by the negative effect of 
the variations in quantities. Apparently, in the 
definition of the short term used in this study, 
which corresponds for poultry meat to the short 
cycle of the economy's dynamics, the criteria of 
the theory which assumes supply inelasticity do 
not apply, even if they appear to do so. 
9. Beef 
The long-term output trends and the gross value 
of the output of beef showed an upward curve. 
Prices, however, followed a typical quadratic 
path, first rising and then falling. In the short 
term, output was associated positively with real 
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wages in the previous year and negatively with 
rainfall in Puno, the main livestock area. Prices 
were inversely related to the quantities 
produced. 
The gross value of output in the short term 
also depended more on prices than on quantities. 
The negative impact of the crisis through lower 
demand was therefore not clear, since the effects 
of price and quantity on the gross value of output 
cancelled each other out. Accordingly, the adjust-
ment policies did not affect the real incomes of 
livestock farmers. Once again, as in the case of 
hard maize, wages affected the volumes 
imported and not the prices. 
10. An attempt at aggregation and synthesis 
From the standpoint of the long-term trends, 
i.e., the trends during the period 1970-1985, it 
can be asserted that the adjustment policies had a 
less immediate impact on the quantity produced. 
In the case of the "traditional" products such as 
potatoes, starch maize and beef, output followed 
paths which were not altered by the crisis. The 
reasons for the trends seem to have little to do 
with the main national production cycle created 
by the crisis or with the adjustment policies. Nor 
was the production trend affected by the crisis in 
the case of the most vigorous products, such as 
rice and poultry meat. The cause lay in the power 
of the specific policies on imports substitution or 
consumption patterns. In third place were the 
products for which the prices and quantities pro-
duced were directly affected by relative prices, 
which also depended directly on international 
prices. This was true of cotton and coffee. The 
production trend of both these crops was also 
independent of the domestic cycle. Lastly, sugar 
cane and hard maize followed cubic long-term 
paths and not quadratic ones like national output 
and demand as a whole. Sugar production was 
affected mainly by the availability of water and 
hard maize by the vigour of the substitution 
policy. 
The long-term trend of relative agricultural 
prices was universal. All the prices followed a 
quadratic curve first rising and then falling dur-
ing the crisis. This movement was consistent 
with that of relative international prices and, 
apparently, with the traditional deterioration of 
the terms of trade of commodities ¡n recessions. 
Only poultry meat and its input, maize, were 
exceptions to this trend. In the long term, the 
path followed by relative prices did not coincide 
with that of the real exchange rate even in the 
case of the products whose price fluctuations 
were closely linked to the exchange rate in the 
short term. 
An analysis now follows of the short-term 
performance; the products will first be classified 
into tradeable and non-tradeable in the light of 
the formation of their prices. They will then be 
grouped in terms of the impact of real wages, 
credit or international prices and real exchange 
rates on the quantities produced. 
First we have those products for which inter-
national prices and the real exchange rate were 
decisive in the formation of their prices. These 
products are coffee, cotton, sugar cane, rice and 
hard yellow maize. The effect of the real 
exchange rate was dominant in the short term, 
for its variation accounted for 67 % of the weigh-
ted index of relative prices of these products. In 
the long-term, as already pointed out, their 
movement suggests that international prices 
were the most important factor. It might also be 
argued that the transnational pattern was 
repeated within each country, thus internalizing 
the explanation. /l 
Coffee and cotton can be considered the most 
typical tradeable products, for their prices were 
determined almost exclusively by the two varia-
bles mentioned above. The quantities produced 
also depended on relative prices and on the real 
exchange rate of an earlier period. The other 
products must have been affected by other less 
important factors which offer a better explana-
tion of the determination of short-term fluctua-
tions. Several of them, such as rice, hard maize 
and sugar cane, were affected by factors which 
offset the benefit obtained on the price side. The 
statistical relationship found with wages or with 
credit, depending on the case, suggests a nega-
tive impact. 
In another group of products the variations 
in the quantities produced were the main reason 
for the variations in prices, with an inverse ratio. 
Furthermore, the output was intended exclu-
sively for the domestic market. The products in 
this group are potatoes, starch maize and the two 
livestock products, poultry meat and beef. The 
quantities produced seem to have fluctuated in 
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all cases, except for potatoes, in a similar way to 
wages in the earlier period. Wages were respon-
sible for 36% of the short-term variations in the 
quantities produced. 
In the case of potatoes, rice and hard maize 
the short-term variation in the quantity pro-
duced was more closely connected with the credit 
received than with other policy variables. The 
problem, especially in the case of potatoes, is 
that it is difficult to view credit as an independ-
ent variable when there was also a close relation-
ship between it and the amount of rainfall. 
Nevertheless it must be remembered that the 
trend of real lending to agriculture indicates a 
credit restriction. As this restriction was not 
observed in most of the chosen products, its 
impact must have been on others. To sum up, the 
impact of exchange-rate, monetary and wages 
policies on agricultural production differed 
according to the type of product. From the 
regional standpoint, it is hard to establish from 
the available information that there were differ-
ent impact. On the Coast, producers of poultry 
meat and some rice producers were hurt by the 
austerity policies, but these policies seem to have 
worked to the benefit of producers of sugar cane, 
cotton and hard yellow maize, and of some rice 
producers as well. In the Sierra, in contrast, 
potato producers benefitted, but producers of 
beef and starch maize suffered. Lastly, the situa-
tion was unclear in the Selva; the credit restric-
tion had negative effects on production of rice 
and hard yellow maize, and the real exchange 
rate had positive effects on production of hard 
maize. 
As to the type of producer, sugar co-
operatives and more so cotton co-operatives 
benefitted from the adjustment policies. 
Medium-sized producers of rice were probably 
slightly hurt, and producers of hard maize bene-
fitted. On the other hand, small and medium-
sized producers of potatoes were favoured by the 
adjustment, but the opposite was true of beef 
producers. Lastly, and still in the short term, 
large and medium-sized producers of poultry 
meat suffered. 
The main conclusion is that a suitable frame-
work for agricultural development requires both 
a high real exchange rate and increased credit 
and wages. It is also necessary to establish a floor 
for producers of goods whose prices are very 
sensitive to output variations. This implies real 
heterodoxy in economic management and would 
entail drastic redistribution of capital to waged 
labour. 
The formal equation which comes closest to 
the empirical findings is: 
p = Pa* + E/Pi 
where p is the relative price of the tradeable 
products, Pa* is the dollar price of their counter-
parts in the international market, E is the nomi-
nal exchange rate, and Pi the index of non-farm 
prices (in our case these prices are assumed to 
vary in step with the consumer price index). A 
simpler formula is sufficient for the other type of 
goods: 
where Xa is the variation in the production of 
the same product. 
In turn, the variation in the quantity pro-
duced is connected, in the case of several pro-
ducts, with the variation in demand in a previous 
period, so that we can express it as follows: 
Xa = (WLi/Pi) - 1 
where WLÍ is the nominal level of earnings. 
Lastly, in the case of export products, the 
quantity produced is related to the profits in the 
previous period which, in turn, are determined 
by the relative prices. It can be expressed as: 
Xa = (p) - 1 
The formula for those products whose fluctua-
tion is connected with access to credit is: 
Xa = (C) - 1 
The validity of this equation cannot be ques-
tioned empirically for both in the long term and 
in its fluctuations the aggregate agricultural out-
put follows a curve very close to that of aggregate 
credit. Our reluctance to give it greater weight in 
the product studies is because the results are not 
as conclusive as in the aggregate analysis. 
However, many of the earlier conclusions 
refer to the effect of only a few variables on the 
short-term variations in agricultural output and 
prices. It may have happened that the beneficial 
effects revealed did not offset the long-term 
damage caused by the deterioration ¡n interna-
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tional prices. This can be seen in the contrast 
between the downward trends of the real 
exchange rate and relative international prices. 
On the other hand, the specific policies may have 
altered the effect of the general policies. Lastly, it 
must be remembered that the variable chosen to 
A new interest has been taken in agriculture but 
it has not led to specific and coherent measures 
for capitalization of farming. The minimum 
institutional bases do not exist for the stable 
implementation of specific policies on landhold-
ing, regional priorities and institutional frame-
works, and the role assigned to the State has 
undergone major changes. Accordingly, the spe-
cific policies have not had a widespread impact 
on agriculture. 
The exceptions in terms of continuity are the 
policies on incentives for rice and poultry meat, 
on production in the Selva, on subsidies for 
imported foods and fertilizers, and on the prior-
ity to be given to agriculture in development 
lending. 
1. The institutional aspects 
The economic crisis occurred at the end of the 
process of agrarian reform which had altered the 
system of ownership of the large production 
units, both modern and traditional. The main 
concern during the reform was with institutions 
and not directly with development. The crisis 
period was marked by the reversal of this new 
institutional framework. The adjustment policy 
was introduced, obviously, in circumstances of 
acute institutional instability which did not 
encourage long-term investment. The economic 
crisis affected the reformed structure of collec-
tive ownership by destroying a large part of the 
co-operative system which had been created and 
replacing it with individual smallholdings. Out 
of 618 co-operatives in existence in 1985, 108 
had received approval for this change in mode of 
operation, 69 were in the process of making the 
represent real peasant incomes does not take 
into account changes in production costs. The 
uncertainty about the value of the respective 
figures directed us towards the gross real value of 
output used in this study. We will end this sum-
mary with a brief review of the specific policies. 
change, and 101 had actually parcelled out the 
land. Various factors contributed to this develop-
ment, including: the difficult weather conditions 
in the last decade, when there were serious 
droughts and floods; the lack of clarity in the 
operational structure of the co-operatives, which 
had no goals of accumulation and rationalization 
of production; management difficulties and cor-
ruption, which undermined the confidence of 
the members in the reformed enterprises; the 
lack of proper retirement arrangements, which 
reduced the incentive to retire from individual 
ownership; and the hostility of the last two 
governments to the co-operative model. 
Marketing was the other area in which an 
important reversal of the institutional frame-
work took place. For example, a food marketing 
network had been established during the agrar-
ian reform which delivered food to the consumer 
through a chain of supermarkets. The deregula-
tion, intensified by the government of President 
Belaunde, destroyed this system and with it the 
possibility of price regulation. 
2. The policy of imports subsidies 
The main foreign trade policy was to subsidize 
imported foodstuffs to satisfy the massive urban 
consumption. In the long term, imports of wheat 
and maize-sorghum tended to increase, and 
there was a general rise in the imported compo-
nent in the basket of consumer goods. The long-
term trend was not altered by the economic 
crisis, but natural disasters did have a visible 
impact. Imports rose on these occasions and 
subsequently maintained their higher level. The 
establishment of new patterns was encouraged 
IV 
The specific policies 
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by the policy of subsidies for already subsidized 
imports. 
In 1977 the annual subsidies for these items 
amounted to 96.6% of the imported value. In 
1978, under the austerity policy, they were 
reduced to 15.7% but then climbed back to 
62.3% in 1979. The most obvious example was 
that of inputs for production of poultry meat, 
which became cheaper in comparison with beef, 
pork and lamb. 
In short, and in accordance with the available 
information, the prices of food products with a 
high imported component were adversely 
affected by the adjustment policies. This was due 
to the overall policy of devaluation and the spe-
cific policy of reducing imports subsidies. In the 
long term, however, the imports subsidies were 
a factor in the systematic fall in the prices of 
imported products in relation to those of domes-
tic products and an incentive for their increased 
consumption. 
3. Prices policy and the agricultural crisis 
Producers' profits fell. During the 1970s, in par-
ticular in the second half of the decade, the input-
product terms of trade were clearly negative for 
cotton, sugar cane, yellow maize and potatoes. 
The increases in the cost of inputs, labour and 
machine hours were larger than the price 
increases. During the period of macroeconomic 
adjustment the machine-hours cost increased 
the most, followed by day wages. The fertilizer 
subsidy was a compensatory factor in the case of 
inputs. These results are important because they 
illustrate the progress made in the basic labour 
force. However, it is difficult to obtain reliable 
figures on the movement of costs during the past 
15 years. 
The end result of this deterioration in the 
terms of trade was decapitalízation of modern 
agriculture in favour of industry. Rice was the 
product which best resisted the crisis as its prices 
rose faster than its costs between 1975 and 1978, 
which was not the case for the other crops. 
In the 1980s the priority products were the 
only ones whose costs rose less than their prices: 
in rice owing to the movement of controlled 
prices; and in yellow maize owing to higher 
productivity and prices. In the case of potatoes, 
the production increases resulting from better 
weather conditions were reflected in an enor-
mous drop in prices. In cotton and sugar cane, 
products not covered by a specific policy, costs 
rose more than prices. 
4. Financial policy 
In 1975 agriculture received barely 3 % of the 
total allocation of credit in the country, industry 
38%, trade 26%, and construction 12%. Of this 
small amount, private banks lent only 5%, and 
the Agrarian Bank was the institution which 
supported the sector. 
Loans were received by barely 7% of the 
production units, representing 19% of the culti-
vated area. Rice, cotton, potatoes and maize 
received 78% of the loans in 1975. The main 
beneficiaries of the lending were the large collec-
tive enterprises, and those who received least 
were the Andean peasants. 
The following changes have taken place in 
recent years: rice has made a major advance; 
cotton has declined; preference has been given to 
lending to individual producers; and the amount 
of credit has fallen as a result of the recession. 
Analysis of the impact of credit on output 
shows that there was a real increase in the 
credit/product and credit/hectare ratios in the 
long term; however,, aggregate output fell. As 
pointed out earlier with respect to certain pro-
ducts, it would seem that credit had no positive 
influence on output in the long term, 
Another very important point is that, des-
pite the negative real interest rates, the financial 
costs of the farms rose enormously. The decapi-
talízation of agriculture is clearly reflected in the 
financial situation of the modern farms. The 
proportion of financial costs in total costs rose 
from 8.3% in 1978 to 30.2% in 1983 for pota-
toes, from 13.1 to 48.6% for cotton, from 7.3 to 
30.2% for yellow maize, and from 6.9 to 30.2% 
for rice. In these products, as may be imagined, 
bad debts increased owing to the fall in profits 
caused by the deterioration in relative prices. 
5. Summary 
To sum up, the specific policies are of great 
importance in the determination of the final 
results of the crisis in Peru's agriculture. A more 
detailed study than the present one is therefore 
needed. It can be said that in general terms the 
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macroeconomic policy was not backed up by a 
coherent set of specific policies. Prices policy 
served to protect agriculture from external com-
petition but it also increased costs. The supply of 
the massive urban market required a degree of 
continuity in the production incentives for poul-
try meat and rice. In institutional terms, the 
main goal was to reverse the agrarian reform 
and the State marketing system. With respect to 
the regionalization of agriculture, the regional 
emphasis varied with the successive govern-
ments. Production in the Selva has been given a 
particular boost in recent years. Lastly, the crisis 
seems to have affected the already fragile process 
of capitalization. The financial problems, the 
cutback in the research work financed by the 
public sector, the institutional instability and the 
growing shortage of experienced agricultural 
professionals, in addition to the recurrence of 
very destructive weather conditions, have all 
contributed to this outcome which will have its 
greatest effects in the years to come. 
